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I. INTRODUCTION 
The manifest image is teeming with activity.  Objects are booming and buzzing by, 
changing their locations and properties, vivid perceptions are replaced, and we seem to 
be inexorably slipping into the future.  Time—or at least our experience in time—
seems a very turbulent sort of thing.  By contrast, time in the scientist image seems 
very still.  The fundamental laws of physics don’t differentiate between past and 
future, nor do they pick out a present moment that flows. Except for a minus sign in 
the relativistic metric, there are few differences between the temporal and spatial 
coordinates in natural science.  We seem to have, to echo another debate, an 
“explanatory gap” between time as we find it in experience and as we find it in 
science.  Reconciling these two images of the world is the principal goal of philosophy 
of time. 
 
Two very different conceptions of time allegedly correspond to the above two images. 
On the so-called tenseless view, all times are on a par, there is no flow, and the present 
moment is not distinguished.  The fundamental temporal properties are the relations of 
precedence and simultaneity.  The past, present and future do not, strictly speaking, 
exist; this division only makes sense relative to a given event.  In particular, the 
present moment—the now—is not at all special, since the present for some event is 
comprised merely of those events simultaneous with it. This conception of time is 
found in the scientific image.  In classical physics, for example, time is conceived as a 
one-dimensional topological space that is homeomorphic to the real number line.  
None of the real numbers are distinguished as special, nor are any greater or lesser 
except relative to a specified number. Tense theories, by contrast, take their cue from 
conscious thought and action, which divides times into the trichotomy of past, present 
and future.  Tensers reify these categories found in our egocentric view and claim that 
they are objective classifications.  Unlike the relation ‘to the left of,’ which needs two 
objects to make sense, ‘in the present’ makes sense as a monadic non-relational 
property according to tensers.  For tensers your reading this sentence is present 
simpliciter, not present merely relative to other cotemporaneous events.  Tensed 
theories of time come in many forms, but most judge the present objectively special.  
It may be the only time that exists (presentism), the cusp of the moving now 
(becoming), or the point at which some future “branches” disappear.  In all these 
theories the present is not something that can be read off from the set of all relations of 
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precedence and simultaneity in the world.  The common now is ontologically elite, 
something extra not captured by physical theory.1 
 
An ontologically special present has been the target of nearly a century's worth of 
attacks.  Conceptual arguments, like McTaggart's, and scientific arguments, like that 
from special relativity, try to demonstrate that this tensed present is logically and 
physically impossible, respectively.  Focusing on impossibility proofs, however, has 
had unfortunate consequences for the detenser.  First, detensers probably have not 
succeeded in obtaining outright victory.  Second, excessive concentration on outright 
victory left the tenseless theory hollow and undeveloped when it comes to explaining 
our experience and intuitions.  This result was natural; after all, if the tensed theory 
could be shown impossible, detensers win.  They could then explain the phenomena at 
their leisure, confident in victory that it must be possible.  However, if this “nuclear” 
strategy fails and the debate becomes “conventional”, that is, a debate over which 
theory best explains the phenomena, detensers are left with little to say.  Beginning 
with our egocentric view of the world, tensed metaphysical systems are commonly 
said to be more in tune with our experience of time than tenseless theories.   
 
Does experience really favor the tensed theory?  Although that is the usual advertising, 
I believe it is an open question.  Contemporary analytic philosophers of time typically 
point in a perfunctory way to various stock mental experiences as a justification of 
their byzantine metaphysical systems.  One is told that we feel time pass or that the 
present is sensed as special—as if we know exactly what that means—and that we can 
only explain this through a tensed metaphysics. Meanwhile, those who have studied 
temporal experience in detail, e.g., phenomenologists and contemporary cognitive 
scientists, typically remain silent about the metaphysics.  
 
It’s time detensers stand up for themselves and challenge the claim that experience 
favors tenses.  This paper has a negative and a positive aim.  After briefly arguing that 
there is no "experience of the present" as contemporary metaphysicians conceive it, 
the paper turns to the main topic: explaining why people have the powerful intuition 
that there is a mind-independent Now and don't believe the same about the spatial 
Here. The positive part of the paper offers a new theory explaining this difference.  
Oddly, given the central role temporal experience plays in philosophy of time, 
empirical work on time perception is virtually absent from this literature.  When this 
neglect is rectified, one sees resources emerging in recent experiments in cognitive 
neuroscience and psychology that bear on the problem.  If I am right, we already have 
enough information for us to fill out significantly the best explanation of the difference 
between the Here and Now. 
                                                
1 I confess that I'm not convinced all of the debates between so-called "tensed" and "tenseless" theories 
are genuine; see my "Time's Ontic Voltage" and references therein.  But I am confident that there is a 
genuine controversy between those who want to supplement or correct the temporal relations posited by 
natural science and those who don't.  Since this division mostly tracks the standard one, I'll retain the 
monikers "tensed" and "tenseless" for the sake of conformity with the literature.     
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II. THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESENCE OF EXPERIENCE 
The philosophy of time literature often speaks of "the problem of the presence of 
experience."  However, a variety of problems actually go under this name, and as we'll 
see, few have anything really to do with experience, and none are damaging to the 
tenseless theory of time.   
 
Consider some experience, say, reading this paper.  While you read this—right now—
you're experiencing the present. Reading the beginning of the previous sentence is 
now fading into the past and new events are being “lit up” by the feature of 
presentness.  These new events—reading this sentence—are now present.  Is there 
something in this prosaic experience that is problematic for the detenser? 
 
I believe that there is only if one reads the theory into the data.  One frustrating feature 
of the metaphysics of time literature is that it habitually does this.  For example, Craig 
2000 claims that we are “appeared to presently” (139), where he means via a tensed 
present, and Schlesinger 1991 claims that the present, unlike the past and future, is 
“palpably real” (427), as if we stand outside the realm of what exists and can feel the 
contrast with the unreal.  To evaluate such claims, we must carefully disentangle the 
experience itself from judgments and descriptions of it. Since our mental 
representations of the world are often tensed, it's often natural to describe our 
experience as if we are interacting with some feature of the external world called 
presentness.  Yet it's hardly clear that being present is a phenomenal property.  Even if 
it were, it wouldn't follow immediately that there is an objective tensed present, for we 
know that there are plenty of experiences for which a similar inference would be 
mistaken, e.g., as in hallucinations. 
 
Is being present a phenomenal property?  Right now I sense my computer humming, 
black and white colors, and pain in my lower back, but I don't perceive a stamp of 
presentness on any experience.  I am not at all sure I have an experience of 
presentness—as opposed to simply at present having an experience.  Moreover, it 
seems that there are two pretty good reasons to deny this phenomenological property 
exist—arguments even tensers agree with (e.g., Hestevold 1990).  The first is Mellor's 
1998 point that objects look the same to us even if they are in the past. The 
experienced point of light from Jupiter is of an object an hour in the past.  Other points 
of light in my visual field may look the same even if the source is roughly present or 
something a million years old.  Since events look the same despite tremendous 
differences in age, the view that we're sensing the property of being present of 
objects/events seems problematic. 
 
The tenser Craig 200 protests: 
 
as a result of physics and neurology, we now realize that nothing we sense is 
instantaneously simultaneous with our experience of it as present.  But in most 
cases, the things and events we observe are contained within a brief temporal 
interval which is present …and our basic belief makes no reference to instants, 
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so that such a basic belief remains properly basic even for scientifically 
educated persons like ourselves.  The fact that under extraordinary 
circumstances our basic belief in the presentness of some event/thing should 
turn out to be false is no proof at all either that we have no basic beliefs 
concerning the presentness of events/things in the external world or that such 
beliefs are not properly basic.  Mellor is therefore simply wrong when he 
asserts that we do not observe (defeasibly) the tense of events. (143) 
 
This response is untenable.  We may well have beliefs concerning the presentness of 
events in the external world, but that doesn't mean we observe the tense of events. 
Moreover, contrary to Craig, there is nothing "extraordinary" about seeing stars or 
hearing thunder after seeing lightning. 
 
The second reason to think being present is not a phenomenal property is that 
phenomenal properties distinguish some experiences (or aspects of experiences) from 
others (Hestevold 1990).   The property being loud distinguishes some experiences 
from quieter experiences, and being red distinguishes parts of my visual field from 
other (say) blue parts.  But every experience is present, and so the property doesn't 
play this crucial role. 
 
The natural re-phrasing of the idea is: the objects we perceive aren't present, but the 
sensory experiences we have when we perceive them are.  In other words, conscious 
experiences are confined to the present. The metaphor of a spotlight moving along a 
wall, where the light is supposed to be present conscious experience, is popular here.  
Despite its popularity, this claim clearly begs the question.  On a tenseless conception 
all times are on a par.  My experience of my first day at school is a conscious 
experience, but alas, it is in the distant past.  To avoid begging the question, the claim 
must be that in the present all my conscious experiences are present.  Yet this 
tautologous statement is something the detenser happily can endorse.  To cause trouble 
for the detenser, the tenser must either read the theory into the data again. 
 
Given these snags, it shouldn't be too surprising that the quandary the literature usually 
dubs "the problem of the presence of experience" in fact has little-to-nothing to do 
with experience.  Here, for example, is a recent statement of the most prominent 
problem: 
 
The challenge I wish to consider is that manifested by conscious experience… 
[T]he present is experientially privileged in that we are only ever capable of 
experiencing that which occurs in the present. To put this observation another 
way, though we may know all week that the movie and Friday, 1:00 p.m. are 
simultaneous, when we learn that Friday, 1:00 p.m. is present and, therefore, 
that the movie starts now we seem to learn a new fact. Accordingly, tenseless 
relations cannot be all there is to time and the best explanation of the presence 
of experience is that the present is ontologically privileged, more real than 
other times. (Mozersky 2006, 441-442) 
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Mozersky is summarizing the objection one finds to a tenseless metaphysics found in 
(e.g.) Ludlow 1999 and Craig 2000.  Notice that the connection with experience is so 
deeply ingrained in the literature that even a detenser like Mozersky provides an 
experiential gloss in the first two sentences of quote—in contrast to the actual 
problem.  The actual problem is precisely what Perry 2001 calls the Temporal 
Knowledge Argument.  This argument is the temporal version of the Knowledge 
Argument in philosophy of mind, wherein colorblind Mary has an operation to recover 
color vision and thereby allegedly learns a new non-physical fact.  Perry declares the 
temporal counterpart of this argument to be the "heart" of the tensed theory.  He is 
right.  The argument comes in many forms, but the core idea is that tensed 
propositions give knowledge or make certain behaviors rational that tenseless 
propositions do not. 
 
Evaluation of such arguments hangs on delicate issues regarding indexicals and 
contexts of representation, not experience. Making the debate about this argument 
means that all the claims about the present being experienced as special and privileged 
are mostly rhetorical bluff unrelated to the actual argument for tenses. 
 
Is this argument, whether experience-based or not, a good one?  Not at all.  Indeed, I 
believe the continued reliance on it in philosophy of time is something of a scandal. 
The Temporal Knowledge Argument and related puzzles (see Mozersky 2006) plainly 
reflect quite general features of indexicals.  There is nothing special about temporal 
indexicals here.   We've known for a long time that indexicals are essential: replacing 
non-indexicals into indexical beliefs doesn't preserve the cognitive significance and 
explanatory power of the original indexical beliefs. It is true that the correct semantics 
for terms like 'now' and 'present' is a complicated and open project.  I have neither the 
space nor ability to delve into it.  However, even without possessing the final, true 
theory of temporal indexicals, we know that the argument isn't compelling because 
there is nothing special with respect to temporal as opposed to spatial and personal 
indexicals.  The argument works, mutatis mutandis, to show that the Here and the Self 
exist.  I suppose one could bite this bullet.  But even then the result would not be a 
theory of time different from our theory of space.  (For a detailed rebuttal of the most 
recent versions of the argument from temporal indexicals, see Mozersky 2006). 
 
The other argument in the literature advertised as stemming from experience of the 
present is again about an attitude about this experience, and this time the problem 
favors detensers.  Here it is: 
 
Whoever I am, and whenever I believe my experience to be present, that now-
belief is true.  This is the inescapable presence of experience that we B-
theorists must explain away (Mellor 1998, 44) 
 
The detenser's solution, admitted as a good solution by some tensers, is simply to treat 
the present as an indexical.  Since the present then picks out that very experience, my 
belief that the experience is now is bound to be true.  The only question is whether 
various tensed theories can offer as compelling an answer. 
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The last hurrah of the tensed argument from the presence of experience comes in the 
form of complaints against the tenseless account of temporal indexicals.  Application 
of the Kaplan-Perry treatment of indexicals results in (although it was independently 
devised by J.C.C. Smart and others) what is known as the token-reflexive account of 
the truth conditions of tensed statements.  The token-reflexive account states that the 
truth conditions for the judgment that some experience e is present is that e is 
(roughly) simultaneous with the judgment.  Many complain that there is some 
phenomenological fact ignored by the token reflexive analysis.  The detenser Balashov 
2005 argues that the token reflexive account misses the fact that some experiences are 
"more radically" present than it allows; Falk 2003 holds that "presentness is an 
inextricable part of all sensory awareness…and A-theorists are right to insist on an 
account of the experience of presentness that does not appeal to any reflexivity" (221).  
The critics are undoubtedly correct.  The token reflexive account explains a correlation 
between a type of judgment, belief or other propositional attitude about presentness 
and an experience.  It doesn't account for or describe an experience itself—that's is not 
it's job. 
 
The question then is, what is the experience tensers want to appeal to? We're back to 
square one.  Detensers admit that the representations are tensed.  Is there anything 
more than that?  Balashov 2005, for example, tries hard to identify this experience not 
captured by the token-reflexive theory.  He says tenseless accounts to date miss the 
crucial feeling, the feeling of events "simply occurring" (295).  What is it to simply 
occur?  Balashov struggles to say.  At one point he explains that the "hard problem" of 
the presence of experience is that "some experiences are known to be occurring, or 
present, as opposed to not occurring, or absent" (296). But if this problem is about 
knowledge (and not feeling), and in particular, knowledge at one time that other 
experiences don't exist—as opposed to don't exist now—then the claim is clearly 
question-begging.  Later Balashov settles on the "distinctive aspect" of occurrence as 
the alleged fact that "present experiences are known to be occurring simpliciter, in 
addition to occurring when they are" (298).  This again pushes our question back: 
what is occurring simpliciter?  The answer is more Latin—the experience, he says, is 
"sui generis (298)—but we never get more lumen. 
 
In sum, we have not found any distinctive aspect of experience that deserves to be 
dubbed experience of being present. Direct appeals to phenomenology are rare and 
unconvincing.  Instead the literature focuses on various puzzles involving temporal 
indexicals and then adds a thin coating of phenomenological language to justify the 
use of the word "experience."  And the trouble with temporal indexicals vanishes as 
soon as one runs the spatial and personal indexical versions of these arguments.  We 
have not fouind good reason to posit a phenomenal property of being present. 
III. The Common Now 
Although temporal indexicals function like spatial indexicals, our language and 
thought about time is sometimes very different than it is in the corresponding cases 
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about space.  In particular, we seem endowed with some very powerful intuitions 
supporting the view that reality is divided into past, present and future, and that this is 
so not merely relative to one's current perspective.  Focusing on the present, 
Butterfield 1984 identifies three such intuitions.   
 
We more readily take as real the presently-existing objects, wherever they are, 
than the objects that are at some time located here…We are more apt to give 
sentences time-variable truth-values than space-variable ones…And we think 
of ourselves as sharing a common, albeit ever-changing, now, while we each 
have a different here…. (161)  
 
To elaborate, and starting with the first, consider the way we existentially quantify in 
natural language.  We might use "there is" with absolutely widest scope, meaning that 
there is said entity at some time or other at some location or other, as when we say that 
a spacetime has a singularity in it, or we may restrict the scope to the present time, as 
when we say that there aren't any dodo birds.  Call the first eternalist quantification 
and the second presentist quantification.  Eternalist quantification doesn't distinguish 
time from space; presentist quantification clearly does.  The claim is that we use 
presentist quantification far more naturally than we do its spatial counterpart, 
quantification restricted to a location.  
 
Regarding the second, the claim is that we more readily accept truth-values changing 
with time than with space.  I admit that I am dubious of this claim.  I think we're 
equally happy with indexing, for instance, "It is raining" to changing locations as 
changing times. 
 
The third is the most compelling intuition. We tend to think of ourselves as sharing a 
common mind-independent now but aren't tempted by such a claim about the here.  By 
this I mean more than merely that we find ourselves believing in a unique foliation of 
the world into simultaneity classes.  That is true.  But we additionally believe that one 
of these simultaneity planes is distinguished.  People think of the present as the only 
real or determinate time, as something that moves, and so on.  The strength of such an 
intuition is evinced by the existence of philosophy of time itself, with so many 
philosophers arguing for presentism, as well as the reaction one finds in students when 
teaching the relativity of simultaneity.  Part of the shock of relativity is its conflict 
with the idea of a special common now.  The relativity of co-location, by contrast, 
garners mild interest.  We don't have any of these intuitions regarding the here.  To my 
mind, this intuition of a privileged common now is the deepest one and also the one 
responsible for the other two, to the extent that they exist. 
 
Spinoza thought that, insofar as we are rational, we ought to direct ourselves to the 
future, present and past equally.  Apparently an early advocate of the tenseless view, 
he evidently believed that one ought to dismiss our intuitions that favor the now.  
While we may ultimately wish to do so, as I mentioned at the outset, dismissing the 
intuitions instead of explaining them leaves the tenseless account of time somewhat 
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hollow.  It is better to explain these intuitions where they are strong and then evaluate 
them after an explanation. 
IV. Present Patches  
Why do people invest such significance in a common now but not to a common here?  
If the tenseless theory is right, people are mistaking their egocentric representation of 
the time with objective time itself.  Why do we conflate the two in the case of time but 
not space? 
 
Part of the answer, I think, comes from the fact that for most of history, both in 
scientific and in lay thought, people subscribed to what the historian of physics 
Jammer 2006 calls the visual simultaneity hypothesis.  This hypothesis holds that 
events that are seen together are simultaneous with one another.  No comparable 
spatial version of this hypothesis seems to have been entertained; from an early age we 
learn that some objects we see are local (e.g., my feet) and some far away (e.g., that 
distant mountain).  For most of history experts and non-experts agreed—explicitly or 
implicitly—that light traveled at an infinite or effectively infinite speed.  Authorities 
such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kepler argued that this must be the case, and the 
ordinary person would have no experiences that suggested otherwise.2  Only in 1676 
did the Danish astronomer Olaf Roemer suggest observations that supported the finite 
speed of light (it better explained the otherwise mysterious eclipses of Io).  Soon 
thereafter Bradley vindicated this claim.   
 
If one thinks that everything one sees, no matter how near or far, happen at the same 
time, one can see how natural and tempting the idea of a unique global objective now 
becomes.  Time is one-dimensional and directed (or at least the processes in it are 
directed).  As a result, one cannot freely move to the past, nor are there orthogonal  
temporal directions to explore.  Memories accumulate in this one direction.  
Furthermore, the true relativity of simultaneity is more or less hidden on terrestrial 
scales to instruments as coarse as we. One is this stuck traversing one's timeline in one 
direction, and so is everyone else.  Now if you additionally believe the visual 
simultaneity hypothesis, you therefore believe that everyone you see and interact with 
shares your now.  Our being "stuck" ensures that you won't meet anyone or go 
anywhere to experience any conflicting evidence.  No one will see anyone claiming 
yesterday is now, remembering your future, and so on.  In these restricted 
circumstances, I claim, it is not at all surprising that one might confuse the egocentric 
now with an objective one.  By contrast, thanks to our free mobility along three spatial 
dimensions and no spatial counterpart of the visual simultaneity hypothesis, we are not 
at all tempted to confuse our egocentric here with an objective here.  We know the 
here is not special because we can move around to other ones and see other people's 
here's that are not common with ours. 
 
                                                
2 Throughout history there were dissenters to this view, but I believe they always represented a minority 
opinion.  Advocates of a finite velocity of light include Empedocles, Avicenna, Alhazen, Roger Bacon 
and Francis Bacon.  
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Of course, the visual simultaneity hypothesis is false, and there are senses other than 
vision.  So this line of thought needs more development. The locus classicus of 
tenseless explanations of the intuition of the common now is Butterfield 1984.  In both 
outline and direction, I think it offers the best view to date of a detenser's account of 
the common now intuition.  As his paper provides some of the theoretical framework 
of the present endeavor, it is worthwhile going through its essential argument.   
 
Think about our typical environment from the perspective of physics.  Most 
macroscopic objects typically change their macroscopic properties relatively 
infrequently.  While electrons, quarks, etc. are buzzing around incredibly fast, 
constantly changing their non-essential properties, the macroscopic properties of 
objects such as their size, color, etc. are relatively stable.  The world is 
macroscopically stable thanks to macroscopic objects being nearly electrically neutral, 
chemically stable, unlikely to spontaneously fluctuate to new macrostates, etc.  Now 
consider our visual perception of such objects.  Light is bouncing off these objects and 
reflecting into our eyes.  These objects are typically terrestrial, so the travel time is 
virtually instantaneous.  However, processing the light in the visual system of the 
brain takes time.  The chemical transduction on the retina takes time, as does the 
neural transmission.  The total is roughly 0.5sec.  This is roughly the time lag it takes 
between the state of the object at time t and the formation of our belief (tacit or not) 
about it at time t*.   
 
The interesting thing about this time lag is that, given that objects change their 
macroscopic properties relatively slowly (typically), the time lag does not end up 
falsifying the relevant belief.  Photons reflected from my orange chair are absorbed in 
my eye and processed in a complicated mechanism.  The result of this process is a 
belief at t* that the large object 1m away at t is chair-shaped and orange—and at t* it 
(typically) still is chair-shaped and orange!  The lag t*-t typically doesn't make the 
belief about local macroscopic objects false. 
 
Of course, this makes perfect sense from the perspective of evolution.  Although one 
needs to be cautious in making such statements, evolution plausibly would select for 
creatures whose beliefs about the world match the world as best as possible for each 
time t.  I am not suggesting that evolution selects true beliefs, but merely that large lag 
times usually would not be conducive to survival.  Large lag times plus fast tigers 
wouldn't help reproduction.  Ceteris paribus, there will be evolutionary pressure to 
make t*-t smaller than that needed to typically respond to environmental dangers.   
 
Now consider communication, say, by signing.  (We’ll treat non-visual modalities in a 
moment.)  If I sign “the chair is orange” to you, there will again be a lag.  This time, 
the delay arises from the lag from my visual processing system, the lag arising from 
my signing, and then the lag of your visual processing.  But this total lag is still very 
small, just over a second, and typically it won’t be enough to falsify the information.  
Typically the chair’s orangeness will survive the lag.  We can take the statement to be 
true at the moment of utterance and the moment of reception.  Naturally this feature 
will be crucially important when trying to coordinate action. 
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The same story can be repeated for sound and touch.  Sound, of course, travels much 
slower than light (330 m/s in normal atmospheric conditions).  However, the auditory 
system, relying on mechanical transduction, is much faster than the visual system.  
The tactile sense is the same way.  As a result, we can reliably communicate in typical 
environments about macroscopic objects without including a time stamp , i.e., the B-
temporal relations, of the event we're speaking about.  We can say "the bird is in the 
tree" or "the bird is now in the tree" and manage to impart useful information.  We 
don't need to say "the bird is in the tree at 12.58.03 GMT" to someone standing near 
enough to hear. 
 
Not all of our means of communication permit the ability to go without time stamps.   
Consider a world in which we can only communicate by smell or by post.  Burnt toast 
can linger in a house all day.  The smell of toast does not reliably stamp when it was 
burnt.  Similarly, a letter in the mail without a date on it can often be useless. In both 
cases the lag makes a difference.  Smell as a consequence of its lag is usually 
unreliable; the post is reliable but only if the date is stamped on the letter.  With no 
date provided, a letter from your bank can be worthless. 
 
Fortunately, in our world, we don't need to rely on smell or the post.  As a result, given 
the stability of macroscopic properties and the short t*-t lag for modes of information 
transfer, we can reliably gain and communicate information about the world without 
the use of a time stamp.  We can say or sign "now" and in typical situations both the 
source and the receiver can communicate and interact without confusion.  
 
It didn't have to be this way.  Getting reliable information transfer without the need of 
a time stamp is highly contingent: on our brain’s processing, on the type of world we 
live in, on even the temperature (since the speed of sound varies considerably with 
temperature).  One can imagine things going differently.  Perhaps some worlds are 
“long” worlds where beings are adapted to perceive thunder and lightning as 
simultaneous, either for reasons of processing or facts about how often observable 
properties of macro-objects change.  Imagine dark and very humid worlds wherein 
organisms can’t communicate as reliably via sight or sound.  Perhaps other worlds are 
“short” worlds wherein the window of simultaneity is much shorter.  A world wherein 
observable properties of objects are typically changing much more quickly than here 
may be one wherein beings could only typically communicate visually and not 
through sound (just as we typically communicate through sound but not through 
smell).  
 
Butterfield's framework lends itself to the following picture (which he doesn't suggest 
although I suspect it's implicit).  Call a 'present patch' the spatiotemporal region over 
which typical observers in typical environments do not require a time stamp in order 
to reliably navigate their environments.  Agents assume others are like them.  Just as 
they can form beliefs about ‘now’ and the beliefs typically are not falsified by the lag, 
so they assume for others.  These assumptions are reinforced by the reliability of local 
communication.  A ‘global common now’ is built by patching together these local 
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nows.  The inter-subjective agreement leads to the idea that this ‘global now’ is 
objective.  And since observation creates beliefs about distant objects, we aren’t as 
inclined to create a ‘global here’ as we are inclined to create a global now.  Call this 
theory the Present Patches theory.  This theory is a hypothesis seeking to explain 
various features we associate with the present.  It is an entirely tenseless theory 
according to which the present is not an objective metaphysical global entity, but 







Butterfield has it more or less right.  His paper suggests a satisfying framework for 
explaining how and why we take the present to be objective and global. The small 
time lags involved in communication and in belief formation help explain why the 
present seems to be a mind-independent feature of the world even though it is not. 
 
V. Putting the Mind into the Mind-Dependent Present 
Although I admire the Present Patches theory, it is a bit short on details.  Curiously, 
the mind-dependent theory of the present, from Grünbaum to now, has never really 
focused on the mind.  The main character in the story has been left out.  Not only does 
this leave the theory a bit bare, it omits the most crucial and fascinating part.  The 
mind is doing a lot of work in constructing present patches.  The picture emerging 
from recent work in cognitive neuroscience, behavioral psychology and psychophysics 
is that the mind employs a set of temporal integration mechanisms.  The outputs of 
these mechanisms are present patches, but these patches need not be co-extensive with 
the patches picked out via time stamping, as described earlier. 
 
A temporal integration mechanism is, as the name suggests, a mechanism that 
integrates the stimuli bombarding our senses into temporal units.  Our brains are 
constantly under siege from a confusing and chaotic barrage of information about the 
internal and external worlds.  Sticking to the eternal world, information is coming at 
us from any given event via light, heat, sound, and more.  Each of these signals 
reaches us at different times, thanks to different signal speeds.  Even within a sensory 
modality this may be true, for (say) sound from an event typically will reach one ear 
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before the other.  The processing that occurs within the various sensory organs also 
takes different amounts of time.  So does the neural processing, which depends on the 
pathway appropriate to the sensory modality.  We may also be rigged so that particular 
features of the target sensed affect the speed of processing differently, e.g., the 
intensity.  Add to all of this the effects due to environmental conditions, e.g., whether 
it's humid, and internal conditions, e.g., whether you're alert, and one quickly sees that, 
a priori, there is no guarantee at all that when the stimuli reach your consciousness that 
they will bear any correspondence to the true temporal relations among events.  Yet if 
we're to successfully navigate about the world, we had better have representations that 
make pretty good temporal sense.  That is, the world has objective temporal relations.  
Some events precede others and some occur simultaneously.  To be successful, we 
need to tell whether that rattling sound comes from the same place and time as that 
snake image popping into view, and whether jumping left quickly will help one 
escape. 
 
One of the most remarkable features of the brain is that, despite the onslaught of time-
varying information from external events, we somehow manage to get things more or 
less right.  The brain employs various mechanisms that integrate the information 
gained from various sensory sources.  These mechanisms take advantage of different 
temporal windows and other mechanisms that actively recalibrate the size and shape 
of these windows. These mechanisms weld together sequences of events into a kind of 
gestalt.  In particular, these mechanisms “decide” what events (and what aspects of 
what events) to count as simultaneous and what events to count as non-simultaneous. 
The neuroscientist Pöppell (1988 and references therein) has long argued for the 
existence of various such mechanisms: 
 
…our brain furnishes an integrative mechanism that shapes sequences of 
events to unitary forms…that which is integrated is the unique content of 
consciousness which seems to us present.  The integration, which itself 
objectively extends over time, is thus the basis of our experiencing a thing as 
present.  (Pöppell, 1987, 62-63) 
 
Now, there seems to be broad agreement that various mechanisms is needed, and there 
is more knowledge about what these mechanisms do.  There is disagreement over the 
number of such mechanisms, what they do, how they relate to one another, what type 
of neural activation realizes them, and so on, but there is little disagreement that such 
mechanisms are needed. 
 
What I want to do is add these temporal integration mechanisms into the Present 
Patches theory.  Instead of having to define our local nows in terms of time stamps, we 
can instead define them more realistically in terms of the nows produced by the 
temporal integration mechanisms in the brain.  These are also local and (of course) 
subjective, but they allow us at the very least to put some flesh on the bones of the 
account.  It is because of the integration mechanism that we perceive certain events as 
simultaneous and not others; and it is the similarity between this mechanism in each 
person that allows us to agree on what events happen now.  No doubt there are 
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connections between this mechanism and the story mentioned about time lags and the 
environment.  Had the environment been different this mechanism would surely have 
evolved differently or not at all.  But with the temporal integration mechanism, we can 
now pinpoint more directly the source and extent of the local nows. 
 
Adding the temporal integration mechanisms to the story is a step toward further 
realism.  But it has philosophical consequences too. It explains why the rather 
behaviorist "time stamp" theory holds to the degree it does.  It is the more fundamental 
theory.  We take the present to be global and objective thanks to the operation of this 
mechanism.  Its explanatory power also lays down a kind of challenge to the tensed 
theory.  
 
VI. What Makes a Present Patch 
In this section I want to describe some of the fascinating ways by which the brain 
creates the experienced present moment.  The experiments described will make the 
case for temporal integration and also detail some types of integration. 
 
Let's begin with synchronization within a sensory modality.  Consider first the classic 
experiments by Hirsh and Sherrick 1961 and expanded by Pöppell 1988 and others. 
Put headphones on a subject and let her listen to tones lasting for 1ms.  If the left and 
right ears are stimulated simultaneously, then the subject hears not two tones but one 
fused tone.  One can then stimulate the two ears non-simultaneously but very close 
together at 2ms apart, and the two acoustical stimuli will still be fused together.  But if 
one stimulates the two ears much further apart, say at 3ms or 4 ms, we pass the fusion 
threshold and suddenly hear two clicks. These experiments are one way of 
determining what events seem present to us and what events do not.  Two audio events 
in this context separated objectively by (say) 2ms will appear as one event and not one 
followed by another.  Our subjective present is wide enough to include both events as 
one.  Of course this fact should not surprise anyone: if time is continuous and we are 
finite, we wouldn’t expect to perceive arbitrarily short events any more than we should 
expect to see electrons. For obvious reasons, this interval during which events are 
fused is called the modality's "window of simultaneity," which is a concept that will be 
useful to us.3  
 
Interestingly, the window of subjective simultaneity varies from person to person, 
from 2ms to 5ms.  It also varies with age, older people fusing more events than 
younger people.  In each person, the minimum threshold of simultaneity cannot be 
shrunk.  This is the same for the other sensory modalities, too, such as visual and 
                                                
3 Incidentally, it is a striking and robust finding that after a few more ms, a subject can tell that 
there are two clicks, yet she cannot tell which one came first.  The order threshold, the 
minimal interval between two stimuli at which one can discern which came first, comes much 
later, at around 20ms. 
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tactile senses.  In each of these, there will be a minimum window of fusing events 
together as subjectively present (up to 10ms for tactile sense, 20ms for vision) but this 
will vary from person to person.  We don't usually notice these differences, but they 
can become apparent when making very precise measurements—as in an infamous 
episode at the Greenwich observatory in 1796 (see Mollon and Perkins 1996). 
 
Consider now the binding of multisensory signals from a common target into a 
subjectively simultaneous whole.  This audio-visual simultaneity window also varies 
from person to person. Stone et al show that the point of subjective simultaneity is 
observer specific.4 However—revealed in another experiment—the point of subjective 
simultaneity is remarkably stable for each individual.   
 
Suppose a friend from across the room shouts "Now!"  The light carrying the visual 
information is traveling at 300,000,000m/s and the sound is lagging behind, traveling 
at merely 330m/s. This difference in speed is compensated, in part, by two processes 
that favor sound: (a) the mechanical sound transduction by the hair cells of the inner 
ear is many times faster than the chemical phototransduction in the retina, and (b) the 
neural transmission time from the visual cortex to the cerebral cortex is greater than 
that from the auditory cortex to the cerebral cortex. The exact calculations will depend 
on various features5, but it turns out that the horizon of simultaneity between light and 
sound in perception intersects at about 10m from the subject. That is, (a) and (b) 
cancel out the difference in signal speed when you're 10m away from your friend.   
 
Why, then, does the image of your friend's mouth match the sound even when he or 
she is closer or further away than 10m?  How does the brain figure out that the sound 
and light were emitted simultaneously when the processes described by (a) and (b) 
don't cancel the speed discrepancy?  Of course, at some point the brain does not weld 
the two aspects of the event into a simultaneous whole.  The phenomenon of thunder 
and lightening is perhaps the most conspicuous such case.  We hear the sounds later 
than seeing the light.  And if the event is up close, we can react quicker to an auditory 
source than to a visual one; so up close there are cases where the brain—at least for 
quick reactions—is not waiting for the visual processing to catch up.  Still, the brain is 
surprisingly tolerant of asynchronous information.  There are no noticeable 
discrepancies between the image of the lips moving and the sound "Now!" at any 
typical communication distance.  From experiment (Dixon and Spitz 1980) we know 
                                                
4 Subjectively perceived simultaneity is measured with either "points of subjective simultaneity" (PSS) 
or "temporal order judgments" (TOJ).  PSS is determined by asking subjects to make a forced choice 
about whether two stimuli are simultaneous or successive.  These decisions are plotted as a normal 
distribution, with "number of times subjects said simultaneous" plotted against the stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) between the two stimuli.  The curve's peak indicates what SOA is the most likely 
one for subjects to answer "simultaneous."  A TOJ, by contrast, presents two stimuli at different SOA's 
and asks subjects which one came first.  When subjects perform at chance levels, they cannot tell which 
one came first and this time is understood as the point of perceived simultaneity. 
5 The narrow range implied by (a) and (b) should not be considered fixed.  The intensity and contrast of 
the stimuli can affect the response latencies of nerve cells, as can the place of stimulation upon the 
retina in the case of sight.  In the case of sound the signal speed from the target also varies. 
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that your friend can emit "Now!" as much as 250ms after moving his or her lips before 
you would notice the discrepancy.  Why is this? 
 
One answer is simply that the multisensory temporal integration window—the 
multisensory counterpart of the simultaneity window discussed above—might be very 
wide.  See Fig. 2. If the amount of time required to bind together cross modal stimuli 
is large, then we simply wouldn't notice small asynchronies between the light and 
sound.  Since binding together information from across the sensory modalities must 
take some time, processes (a) and (b), coupled with a wide temporal integration 







Is a wide integration window the full story?  It seems not. While research is ongoing, 
the literature has revealed other possible mechanisms of enforcing perceptual 
synchrony.  These mechanisms radically alter the size, shape and behavior of the 




Ventriloquism is the ancient art of making a sound appear in a spatial location that is 
not its source.  Famously the sight of the puppet's mouth captures the sound emanating 
from the puppeteer.  Since the puppeteer's mouth is not visibly moving the brain 
matches the sound's location in space to the mouth that is visibly moving.  The 
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modality appropriateness hypothesis (Welch et al 1986) is the thesis that the sensory 
modality that provides the most accurate information will dominate the percept created 
by the brain.  Vision is considered the most accurate source of information about 
spatial relations, and spatial ventriloquism provides some evidence for this hypothesis.  
The sight of the moving mouth dominates the auditory information.  Hearing, by 
contrast, is judged the most accurate modality regarding temporal relations.  Are there 
cases, then, of sound altering one's visual impressions in time like those of sight 
altering one's auditory impressions in space?  Are there cases, that is, of temporal 
ventriloquism? 
 
Researchers have recently discovered many such cases. In Fendrich and Corballis 
2001, subjects were asked to judge when a flash occurred by stating the clock position 
of a rotating marker.  Preceded by a temporally proximate audible click, the flash was 
seen earlier; followed by a temporally proximate audible click the flash was seen later.  
The one stimulus “captured” the other, bringing them closer together in time.  Many 
researchers now have found similar phenomena (see e.g., Morein-Zamir, Soto-Faraco, 
and Kingstone 2003, Spence and Squire 2003).  The interesting thing about temporal 
ventriloquism for us is that it is one quite dramatic mechanism whereby the brain can 
maintain a perception of synchrony even with quite asynchronous inputs; there is even 
evidence that the effect optimizes the chances of matching stimuli from the same event 




Another type of mechanism the brain may employ is not the capture of one input by 
another, but the stretching and recalibration of the simultaneity windows themselves. 
Based on various cues  We'll begin with one that is not audio-visual, and then describe 
two that are. 
   
There is a large body of data supporting the claim that the phenomenal experience one 
has depends in part on one's intentions.  For example, one cannot normally tickle 
oneself.  The intention alters the experience.  Surprisingly, recent experiments have 
suggested that one's experience of synchrony--of two things happening at the same 
perceived time--change when intentions are involved.  In one experiment 
(Cunningham et al 2001), subjects moved a mouse that caused a spot on a computer 
screen to move.  Gradually a lag between the movement of the mouse and the 
resulting effect on the screen was introduced.  Subjects informally reported that soon 
their actions and effects were subjectively simultaneous again.  (Incidentally, the 
experimenters then suddenly shut off the lag, and the subjects reported that the effects 
on the screen occurred before they moved the mouse!)  Haggard et al 2002 then set 
about testing directing whether this was so; whether, that is, a subject’s intentions 
affected the experience itself of what things happen simultaneously.  They confirmed 






Vroomen et al 2004 and Fugisaki et al 2004 show similar recalibration effects, but this 
time caused by cross-sensory influence rather than motor control.  In Vroomen et al's 
experiments, subjects were presented with a succession of sounds and light flashes 
with different lag times in between.  By questioning subjects the point of subjective 
simultaneity is estimated for each.  Subjects then were exposed to a fixed audiovisual 
lag for a few minutes.  It was then found that the audio-visual asynchrony shifted the 
point of subjective simultaneity in the direction of the lag.  That is, after subjects were 
exposed to sound before light pairs, they adapted to this; to judge the two as 
simultaneous the experimenters had to present the sound earlier than the light.  
Fugisaki et al 2004 make plausible that this "lag adaptation" is an adaptation in 
sensory processing rather than cognitive processing by showing that the lag adaptation 
changed the temporal tuning of a hearing-influenced visual illusion. They claim that 
their findings "suggest that the brain attempts to adjust subjective simultaneity across 
different modalities by detecting and reducing time lags between inputs that likely 
arise from the same physical events" (773).  
 
Distance-based Recalibration  
 
Perhaps the most striking instance of simultaneity recalibration is an example where 
the brain seems to take into account target distance (Sugita and Suzuki 2003; see King 
2005 for discussion).  In the experiment subjects were presented through headphones 
bursts of white noise (10ms duration) to simulate external sound from the frontal 
direction.  Brief light flashes were produced by a uniformly spaced array of 5 green 
LEDs at different distances (1-50m).  The intensity of light was altered so as to 
produce consistent intensity at the eye.  Subjects were then asked to imagine that the 
LEDs were the source of the light and sound, while listening to sound directly from 
source.  To estimate subjective simultaneity, observers judged what came first, light or 
sound.  The fascinating result is that subjective simultaneity increased by about 3ms 
with each 1m increase in distance up to about 40m.  Now, as it happens, sound travels 
1m/3ms at sea level and room temperature.  Coincidence? Sugita and Suzuki think not 
and claim that the “results show that the brain probably takes sound velocity into 
account when judging simultaneity” (911). 
 
Variations on this experiment have not always reproduced simultaneity recalibration 
as a function of target distance. Why this is so is an open question.  Taking into 
account target distance would seem to be a computationally complex task, so there are 
probably various "rules of thumb" and/or proxies for target distance employed by the 
brain. The question is then what heuristics the brain uses to tell whether inputs are 
likely from the same source.  Zambini et al 2005 show that one very natural strategy is 
in fact used, namely, they show that subjects are more likely to report stimuli as 
simultaneous when they originate from the same spatial location than when they come 
from different spatial positions.  In any case, this effect, like the lag exposure effects 
described above, suggest the existence of malleable windows of simultaneity. 
 
Flash Lag Effect 
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Finally, it's worth mentioning that the temporal integration mechanisms sometimes 
work in surprisingly odd ways.  These mechanisms are not always successfully 
reproducing the objective temporal relations.    
 
In the flash lag experiment, an annulus moving clockwise traces out a circle on a 
computer screen.  At 9 o’clock on the path, a small light quickly flashes (for .001s) 
dead center in the annulus.  What we see, however, is a flash that lags behind the 
moving object, opposite the subsequent direction of motion.  The flash is well in the 
lower half of the disk.  This effect has long been known. What has not been known 
until recently, however, is that if instead the disk “bounces” down at 9 o’clock, one 
sees the flash in the upper half of the annulus.  In general the flash lags in the direction 
opposite the subsequent direction of motion.  When two retinal images are aligned, 
continuously moving objects appear to lead flashed objects.  What is remarkable is 
that the magnitude and direction of the experienced flash depends on what the moving 
annulus does after the flash.  That is, the experience of t1 at t3 seems to depend on 
events at t2, where t3 > t2 > t1.  This kind of phenomenon is very robust across a variety 
of different experimental set-ups.  Some has also claimed it is manifest in the blinking 
lights of planes at night and possibly even an asymmetry in offside calls in soccer.   
 
The flash lag effect and variants (also in different sensory modalities) has recently 
received an enormous amount of attention in cognitive science and is the subject of a 
variety of competing explanations.  The subject is rife with controversy, both in 
philosophy (e.g., Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992 on the related color phi example) and 
in cognitive science.  In the latter, a slew of possible theories have been offered.  
Possible mechanisms include differential neural latency, spatial extrapolation, 
attention, spatial averaging and postdiction.  See, e.g., Eagleman and Sejnowski 2000 
and references therein.  To get a sense of the explanations, the first one mentioned 
claims that flashed objects take longer to reach awareness than non-flashed 
continuously moving objects, and the last holds that the visual system uses positional 
data about the annulus after the flash when making its perceptual decision about what 




Despite the flash lag effect, it's clear that there a "reconstructive process … that is able 
to resynchronize asynchronous signals by taking into account many factors, both 
internal and external, which would otherwise distort accurate knowledge of timing" 
(Harris et al, forthcoming). Perhaps, as Harris et al suggest, there is a three-stage 
process.  First, stimuli are fit into various temporal windows.  The inputs in these 
windows are the candidates for recalibration.  Second, unfamiliar stimuli are delayed 
according to fixed rules (say, 40ms delay for sound to be bound with light plausibly 
from the same source).  And third, for familiar stimuli often experienced from the 
same target, a more fine-grained delay is used.  This process might try to erase a lag as 
two stimuli are experienced together more and more frequently. 
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Finally, I would be remiss if I didn't point out some shortcomings of the above 
account.  First, the neural basis of the mechanisms is not clear, but it is an active area 
of research.  It is not known whether the mechanisms are bottom-up, i.e., operating on 
neural transmission speeds, or top-down, i.e., operating at the "decision point" after 
this information is already transmitted to wherever the binding occurs.  Second, we've 
restricted ourselves to vision and audition, but in fact there are tactile-vision and/or 
tactile-audition versions of virtually all of the phenomena mentioned above (see, e.g., 
Harris et al). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The temporal integration mechanisms discussed above weld together as present 
information from events over various spatiotemporal distances.  These spatiotemporal 
regions are well suited to play the role the local nows do in our time stamp version of 
the theory.  Interestingly, these spatiotemporal patches are not of fixed distance.  The 
distance recalibration mechanism of Sugita and Suziki, for instance, seems to cease 
operation after the target is 40m away; moreover, only certain stimuli  activate it.  We 
don't yet know the full story.  But clearly—and crucially—the patches will overlap 
considerably with the people and objects with which we regularly interact.  It manages 
this feat despite the point of subjective simultaneity varying considerably among 
different subjects.  In Stone et al's experiment, two of the subjects differed by as much 
as 171ms.  But with integration windows as wide as 250ms, light so fast, auditory 
processing so speedy, and macroscopic objects changing properties relatively slowly, 
these differences—which are detectable—won't often be noticed in daily life.  The 
differences between us aren't enough to undermine the idea that we share a common 
now; rather, the similarities among us enforce this idea. 
 
How does our work relate to the tensed versus tenseless time debate?  The detenser 
now enjoys the beginnings of a theory that accounts for the persistent belief that we 
inhabit a metaphysically distinguished present but not here. The theory is no piece of 
"socio-biological mythology", as Craig (2000, 156) derides the tenseless explanation 
of another phenomenon, the value asymmetry.  Rather it is an independent product of 
some of our best (and most exciting) cognitive neuroscience and physics.  Much 
remains to be learned about temporal integration.  However, we already have enough 
to block the hypostatization of the felt present.  
 
To be clear, I am not saying that the temporal integration mechanism is the whole 
story explaining why a common now but not a common here tempts us.  If I were, then 
one might try to counter the argument by pointing to similar spatial mechanisms.  The 
spatial counterpart of a temporal integration mechanism is a process that welds 
together inputs arriving at different spatial locations into one unified percept.6  Clearly 
                                                
6 The reader may be tempted to think the counterpart of "simultaneity constancy" is the phenomenon 
known as location constancy.  Location constancy refers to the fact that objects generally seem to stay 
in the same place as you move your head around.  However, simultaneity constancy is a mechanism that 
welds together two inputs emitted at the same time from the target event which arrive at distinct times; 
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we employ such mechanisms, even if only in the forming of one percept from 
information going in two eyes or two ears.  These mechanisms are different, but they 
are there.  The full story, as described above, also makes use of the one-dimensionality 
and directionality of time, in addition to the speed of communication and the creation 
of presentness patches. 
 
In sum, once distracting features of temporal indexicals are cleared away (as in section 
II), there is very little in experience suggestive of a tensed present.  What remains is an 
asymmetry between our beliefs about the now and the here.  We endow the now with 
significance that we do not accord to the here, and perhaps even believe that we are 
experiencing a global unique distinguished present. A good tenseless theory ought to 
explain why we have this persistent belief.  The account offered here claims that (a) 
because we cannot freely explore the temporal dimension (or in relativity, timelike 
directions) like we can the spatial and (b) because we share similar temporal 
integration mechanisms that take advantage of the rapidity of signals from the 
environment (but aren't so fine as to notice the relativity of simultaneity), we are led to 
endow the stimuli we group together as present with extra significance.  In short, 
experience makes it easy to confuse the egocentric now with something objective in a 
way experience doesn't allow that with the egocentric here.  We began the paper 
claiming that traditionally the tensed theory's best case came from experience and that 
the detenser's explanation of experience looked comparatively hollow.  Now, with the 
"best case" exposed as empty and a whole lot of experiential data now unaccounted 
for by the tenser, it appears that the roles are reversed. 
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